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INTRODUCTION 
The performance of most Western economies during the last decade 
has promoted renewed interest in research on the so-called Kondra-
tieff long waves with a supposed wave length of some 45 to 60 years. 
According to the time Schedule of the Kondratieff wave, the period 
from the 1890s up to about World War I, as well as that from the late 
1940s to the early 1970s would have to be considered as prosperous 
phases of the long wave, whereas the crisis phenomena of the last 
decade would be consistent with the Western economies having entered 
a new downturn of the long wave, comparable with the downturn of the 
inter-war period. If we extrapolated that scheme in quite a simplistic 
and mechanistic way, it would be tempting to conclude that a new 
revival of the world economy is to be expected somewhere between the 
late 1980s and the middle 1990s. However, it is not our intention 
to further advance or substantiate such speculations. Neither is it 
the task of this paper to give an account of the large variety of 
hypotheses concerning the existence and possible causes of long 
waves. Nonetheless it has to be mentioned that the concept of long 
waves it subject to considerable discussion and research effort. 
The range of opinions reaches from more or less fullacceptance of the 
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A) 
2) . 3) 
hypothesis through cautiously critical statements , up to outright 
rejection 
1) See, for example, the discussion between Weinstock, Mensch and Nullau 
in WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 56, April 1976, or more recently the contributions 
in: Schröder/Spree (ed.) (1981), Petzina/Van Roon (ed.) (1981), or in 
FUTURES (1981). 
2) Van Duijn (1979, 1983), Glismann et al. (1978, 1981), Mandel (1973)and (1980) 
3) Kuczynski (1978, 1980), Metz (1983), Kleinknecht (1981), Spree (1978), 
Rosenberg (1983). 
4) Weinstock (1964, 1976), Milward (1981), Van Ewijk (1981, 1981a), 
Van der Zwan (1980). 
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As in the I920s, there is again a concentration of long wave research 
in the Netherlands , but there are also some contributors from other 
countries who deserve to be mentioned 
Basically, the discussion centers around the question of whether the 
alleged long waves do exist, not only in monetary and price series but 
also in 'real' variables such as industrial output, GNP, etc. Whereas 
long waves in the former are not seriously queötioned, several authors 
have expressed considerable .doubts about long waves in the latter 
Moreover, among those who tend to be convinced that a Kondratieff-like 
pattern of fluctuations does exist, it is still debatable whether to 
conceive them as being driven by exogenous or by endogenous forces. 
Assuming exogenous factors behind the long wave is consistent with the 
waves being historically unique events that are not necessarily to be 
repeated in the future; an endogenous explanation would imply a regular 
recurrence of the wave and some prognostic importance of the long wave 
hypothesis. Only in the latter case can we speak of true cycles. 
It might be argued that debat ing the above points does not make much 
sense as long as there are serious doubts about whether long waves do 
exist at all. There is then some need to test the Kondratieff hypothesis 
more rigorously. 
The present paper will be restricted to this task. We shall present a 
new method for testing whether there are fluctuations over time that 
fit into the time schedule of Kondratieff long waves, and whether the 
amplitudes of such fluctuations are strong enough to be considered 
significant. Our testing method will be applied to series on aggregate 
Br-oersma (1978), Van Duijn (1979, 1983), Van Ewijk (1981, 1981a), 
Kleinknecht (1981a), Van Paridon (1979), Namenwirth (1973), Reijnders 
(1983), Van der Zwan (1980). 
It might be doubted whether Schumpeter did justice to the early Dutch 
contributors on long waves (Van Gelderen, 1913, De Wolff 1924, 1929) when 
introducing the term 'Kondratieff long waves'. Given the quality and 
timing of the Dutch publications we could equally speak of a Van 
Gelderen er a De Wolff cycle. However, these authors remained less 
well-known, since they mainly published in Dutch language. 
Coombs (1983), Forrester (1977), Freeman et al. (1982), Graham/Senge 
(1980), Ray (1980), Rostow (1978), Rostow et al., (1979), Wallerstein 
(1979). 
See, for example, Van der Zwan (1980) or van Ewijk (1981, 1981a) for 
the earlier discussion, see Garvy's critique of Kondratieff (Garvy, 1943). 
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industrial production and GNP of several major industrial countries. 
Not to bother the reader with a lot of details about time series con-
struction, we shall use time series that have already been compiled 
by others (se'e tab Ie 1). The quality of these series is beyond our 
j udgement. 
Table 1. Time Series to be Used for Testing 
Country Variable Time Coverage Source 
United Industrial 1801-1938 Mitchell 1981/0ECD 1983 
Kingdom Production 1946-1981 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
1830-1979 Glismann et al. 1981 
France Industrial 1815-1913, 1919- Mitchell 1981/0ECD 1983 
Production 1938, 1947-1981 
Net Domestic 1900-1913 Glismann et al. 1981 
Product 1920-1979 
Germany Net National 1850-1913, 1925- Glismann et al. 1981 
Product 1941, 1948-1979 
Belgium Industrial 1831-1913 Gadisseur 1979 
Production 1920-1939 
1946-1981 
Mitchell 1981/OECD 1983 
U.S.A. Gross National < 
Product 
1889-1979 Glismann 1981 
Italy Gross Domestic 
Product 
1861-1979 Glismann 1981 
Sweden Gross Domestic 
Product 
1861-1979 Glismann 1981 
World (1) Industrial 1780-1979 Kuczynski 1980/ 
Production 
(excl. Mining) 
Haustein et al. 1982 
World (2) Total Industrial 
Production 
1850-1976 Kuczynski 1980 
(incl. Mining) 
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PUR MODEL 
Research experience until now has shown that spectral analysis is not 
a very promising method for the analysis of long waves. In general, 
the available time series as compared with the length of the cycle 
we are looking for are much too short . Furthermore, the outcomes 
of spectral analysis are quite sensitive to the method of trend elimi-
nation. The latter point also applies to 'classical' methods of separa-
9) tmg time series into components as Glisman et al. (1978) have done. 
Therefore, we decided to choose a completely different method. We 
conceive of long waves as a succession of longer periods of accelerated 
versus decelerated growth. To be more exact, we ought to speak of 
'trend periods' or 'mouvements de fonds' (Dupriez), or in Spiethoff's 
terminology of 'Wechsellagen', instead of using the term 'wave'. In 
the following, for pure convenience, we shall use the term 'A periods' 
for periods of accelerated growth, and periods of decelerated growth 
will be called 'B periods'. If the Kondratieff long wave hypothesis is 
relevant, it should be possible to demonstrate that the alleged A 
periods of the long wave have average growth rates that are significantly 
higher than the average growth rates of the preceding and following 
B periods and vice versa. The average growth rates will be computed from 
the time series cited in tabl.e 1. 
There are two commonly used methods of establishing average growth 
rates: We can take either the logarithms of the geometrie means or the 
slopes of the log-linear trend curves. Although the geometrie means can 
be computed more easily, they have the disadvantage that the average 
growth rates depend only on the values of the beginning and end years 
of the periods. Therefore, we decided to use the slopes of the log-linear 
See, for example, the experience of Kuczynski (1978). 
It is possible, however, that a new method of determining trends in 
time series which has been applied most recently by our German 
colleague, Rainer Metz (1983), will bring a solutian to that problem 
within reach; cf. for example the papers of Metz, Metz/Spree, Stier and 
Schulte in: D. Petzina/G. van Roon (ed.) (1981). 
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trend curves. With this method, the values of each year of the series 
are used, and the. estimation is therefore less sensitive to disturbances 
in the series. 
However, we decided to impose the following restrictions on the trend 
estimates: in the transition years ('peak' and 'through' years) the 
estimated values of the trends for the preceding and the following 
periods have to equal each other. This is consistent with the assumption 
that the transition from A to B periods and vice versa is not subject 
to erratic jumps in the absolute level of our variable. 
To summarize the model verbally: We estimate log-linear trends for the 
different A and B periods, whereby the restrictions imposed guarantee 
a continuous 'zig-zag' pattern. The below defined Y. are the estimated 
values in the transition years. Starting from the values in the transition 
years, we can reconstruct the complete 'zig-zag' line. 
Mathematically our model can be written as follows: 
T is the first year of the series, 
T is the last year of the series, 
m
 J
 ' 
T ,...,T _. are the transition years ('peaks' and 'troughs' 
of the long waves) 
In y„ = a. + b.t is the log-linear trend formula for the i-th J
 t 1 1 ö 
period consisting of the years: T._ ,...,T. 
the restrictions for the trend estimates are: 
a. + b.T. = a.t1 + b. ,T. for i = l,2,...,m-l ï 1 1 ï+l ï+l ï ' ' 
d e f i n i n g Y = a, + b .T and 
° o 1 1 o 
Y. = a . + b . T . f o r i = l , . . . , m 
ï 1 1 1 ' ' 
the model can be re-written without restrictions as: 
in yt = Y.,, + (t - T ) ( * i-j) with t - T ...T. 
ï ï-l 
or, 
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T. - t t - T. 
In Y = — - Y. + — — Y 
t T. - T. , i-1 T. - T. , i 1 1-1 1 1-1 
i.e. y is nothing but the weighted sum of the value of the beginning 
and end years of the period considered. The restriction discussed above 
requires that all the Y. be estimated simultaneously. 
If we now want to test whether the growth rates of two successive 
periods are equal we can test whether the slopes b are aqual for 
the two periods. 
Therefore the following condition has to be fullfilled: 
Y. - Y. , Y. , - Y. ï ï-l _ 1+1 ï 
T. - T. . T. , - T. 1 ï-l 1+1 ï 
This can be rewritten as: 
T. , - T. T. - T. , 
Y. = —i±i i-Y- + — — Y. 1 T. , - T. , xi-l T. , - T. , i+1 1+1 1-1 1+1 ï-l 
We need to add a disturbance term E to the model. However, the 
existence of the medium-term 'classical1 business cycle, among other 
reasons, suggests that the e are autocorrelated. If we took no 
account of the existence of autocorrelation, the estimates of the 
Y. would be unbiased, but ttreir variances are likely to be biased; 
consequently, the significance levels of our test may be biased. 
Therefore, we apply the following tentative solution to the auto-
correlation problem: 
we start with an OLS estimation of the model to obtain the residuals. 
Then we estimate the autocorrelation pattern using the following 
formula: 
e = .E, p. e . + u with: u ~ N(0, az) 
t i=l ï t-i t t ' 
(with n indicating the degree of autocorrelation) 
Knowing the autocorrelation pattern, we re-estimate the Y. with 
GLS (for the mathematical description of that method, see the appendix) 
Eventually we compare the autocorrelation pattern of the residuals of 
the GLS estimate with the previously obtained autocorrelation pattern. 
If both patterns match, we stop iterating ; if they do not, we have 
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to continue the iterating process, taking the last obtained auto-
correlation pattern and repeating the GLS estimate, and so on. 
Thus we actually obtain maximum-likelihood estimates. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TEST AND TESTS BY OTHER AUTHORS 
The advantage of our approach can be summarized as follows: 
- Unlike attempts at applying spectral analysis (cf. Kuczynski 1982), 
Van Ewijk 1981) the reliability of our test outcomes is not 
crucially dependent on the mere length of the available time series. 
- For our test we use time series from a larger range of countries 
than was done by Van Ewijk (1981, 1981a) or by Van der Zwan (1980). 
Whereas most of Van der Zwan's series end during the 1930s, our 
data also cover the more recent period, for whibh the long wave 
hypothesis appears to be most relevant. '' 
- The study of Glismann et al (1981) has the advantage of also using 
a wider range of data. However, it shares with the Van Ewijk (1981a) 
study the weakness that the results are crucially dependent on the 
use of moving average methods, the effects of which are hard to 
control. Although we also included a nine-year moving average in 
our graphs for illustrative purposes, the test results on which 
we concentrate our interpretation do not depend on that method. 
In contrast with the methods of Kuczynski (1980) and Van der Zwan 
(1980), our estimates of growth rates explicitly take into account 
the jexistence of autocorrelation. Furthermore, our estimates are 
som^what more 'stable' as we apply the restriction that the values 
f . . . 
of the estimated trends have to be equal m the transition years 
for the period preceding and following the transition year. As a 
consequence, our test is more robust against minor changes in the 
periodization of long waves. 
- As opposed to authors who try to handle chronologies that are 
better adapted to the pecularities of individual countries (Van 
Duijn 1979, 1983 , Kuczynski 1980 , Van Ewijk 1981a). We concen-
trate our interpretation on quite a rigid time schedule that claims 
a relatively strict regularity and strong synchronization of long 
waves in a world market context. This time Schedule remains closely 
within the boundaries of long waves as given by Kondratieff. In the 
following, this time scheme will bé discussed in more detail. 
THE PERIODIZATION OF LONG WAVES 
Tablè 2 offers a survey of long wave chronologies as given by Van Duijn 
(1983) to which we added the chronologies by Bouvier (1974), Amin (1975), 
and Kuczynski (1980). Given the variety of indicators and methods used 
by the different authors, it is astonishing that most of the chronologies 
nonetheless remain within the time schedule given by Kondratieff. 
Other than the position taken by Rostow for the most recent period, which 
is based on a different approach , important deviations from 
Kondratieff's chronology occur only in the chronology of Van Duijn 
and Clark, taking 1929 as the upper turning point of the third Kondra-
tieff. Since we wanted to restrict the bulk of statistical documentation 
in this paper to a minimum, we did not test all the chronologies in table 
2.12> 
Instead we made a selection. Inprinciple, there are six chronologies in 
tabel 2 that are suitable for testing since they are carried up to the 
present. Among the latter, we decided to choose the one given by Mandel. 
The main reasons for this choice are the following. First, Mandels1 
chronology is closest to the dating of long waves as suggested by 
Kondratieff, i.e. it is the most 'orthodox'. Secondly, Mandel conceives 
his chronology as being valid for the Kondratieff wave as a world 
market phenomenon that can be applied to data on various countries without 
taking too much notice of national pecularities. Therefore, we can 
take his time schedule as an example of quite a rigid conception of long 
waves which claims a strong synchronization of the long wave process 
between countries in a world market context, besides implying a rela-
tively strict regularity of the long waves. 
11) See Rostow (1978); for a clarification, see Wallerstein (1979). 
12) Anyone who would like to test a wider range of chronologies or other 
interesting time series may request the complete computer program 
(FORTRAN) from the authors. 
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Table 2 : Long \ tfave chronologies according te ) various authors 
Ist Kondratieff 2nd Kondratieff 3rd Kondratieff 4th Kondratieff 
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper 
Kondratieff 
(1926) 
ca. 1790 1810/17 1844/51 1870/75 1890/96 1914/20 -
De Wolff 
(1929) 
- 1825 1849/50 1873/74 1896 1913 -
Von Ciriacy-
Wantrup 
(1936) 
1792 1815 1842 1873 1895 1913 
i 
Schumpeter 
(1939) 
1787 1813/14 1842/43 1869/70 1897/98 1924/25 -
Clark 
(1944) 
- - 1850 1875 1900 1929 ' -
Dupriez 
(1947;1978) 
1789/"92 1808/14 1846/51 1872/73 1895/96 1920 1939/46 1974 
Rostow 
(1978) 
1790 1815 1848 1873 1896 1920 1935 1951 
Mandel 
(1973> 
- 1826 1847 1873 1893 1913 1939/48 1966 
Van Duijn 
(1983) 
- - 1845 1872 1892 1929 1948 1973 
Bouvier 
(1974) 
1840 1865 1897 1913 
' 
Amin 
(1975) 
1815 1840 1850 1870 1890 1914 1948 1967 
Kuczynski 
(1981) 
- - 1850 1866 1896 1913 1951 1969 
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Compared with the Mandelian Standard, the chronologies by the other five 
modern authors are certainly not less sophisticated. Actually they are 
somewhat 'softer', trying to adapt themselves better to the national 
characteristics of individual countries. Their main differences with 
Mandel are certainly related to the question of how to treat the two 
World Wars in a long wave context. In some countries we miss up to 
eleven year's data around World Wars I and II. In some other countries, 
the statistical series were continued throughout the war, but we do not 
know to what extent the data are influenced by pre-war armament booms, 
by the war economy, or by post-war reconstruction booms. In the case of 
Germany, it could, for example, be argued that during the first half of 
the twentieth century the data are biased against as well as in favour 
of the long wave hypothesis: the reconstruction effect after World War 
I (the 'golden twenties') as well as Hitler's armament boom caused an 
'exaggeration' of growth rates during the interwar B period, whereas 
the pre-World War I armament race as well as the reconstruction effect 
of the I940s and 1950s yield a higher level of growth rates in the A 
periods of the third and fourth Kondratieff. ünder such circumstances, 
along with missing observations, a somewhat precis e demarcation of long 
wave periods is extremely difficult. 
In that situation, the inspection of the GNP series of Sweden may be of 
some help, since this country did not participate in either of the World 
Wars. Graph A7 of the appendix covers the Swedish GDP series from which 
(for illustrative purposes) we substracted a log-linear trend. The 
Swedish series suggests that the year 1913, as given by Mandel, seems 
indeed to be the appropriate transition year from the A to the B period 
of the third Kondratieff, and that the transition to the A period of 
the fourth Rondratieff should be dated quite closely around World War II. 
The year 1951 as suggested by Kuczynski is obviously too late. The 
impression from graphs Al-All in the Appendix for the different series 
and countries is consistent with interpreting the 'golden twenties' 
primarily in terms of a reconstruction boom, since the peak of 1929 is 
much stronger in countries that were directly involved in warfare as 
compared with such sountries as Sweden. Consequently, taking 1929 and/or 
1951 as transition years would clearly bias our test against the long 
u -v, • 1 3 ) wave hypothesis 
13) This point is confirmed by a test run on our data using the Van Duijn and 
Kuczynski chronologies. The test outcomes are not documentated here; 
they can be requested from the authors. 
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A first test on the Mandelian scheme quickly revealed that 1966 and 
1967 are obviously not adequate transition years to the present B 
period. It should be mentioned that Mandei's chronology was already 
developed during the early I970s, and that today, with roughly a decade 
more of data, we can judge this point more easily and in a more reliable 
way. Therefore we changed the original Mandelian scheme, and took 1974 
14") 
mstead of 1966 . 
Furthermore, in contrast to Mandei's rigid time scheme, we used in 
several cases a 'softer' chronology. The latter was derived from the 
graphs in the Appendix. As an optical aid we used a nine-year moving 
average on the residues of the series after substraction of a log-linear 
trend. The turning point of the smoothed series which was nearest to 
Mandei's transition year was taken as an alternative transition year. 
In general, we would expect the 'soft' scheme to yield somewhat better 
significance levels than the 'hard' scheme of Mandel. This is in the 
same time to check to what extent our test is aensitive to smaller 
changes in the demarcation of A and B periods. 
REMARKS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TABLES 
Before studying the results, four remarks have to be made . 
First: For the period from 1974 onwards, all the estimates documented 
in different tables of this paper have tremendously high Standard errors 
due to the low number of observations. This might explain that, in spite 
of remarkably declining growth rates in most series after 1974, signifi-
cance levels remain poor. However, given the aatual economie develop-
ment, it is certainly realistic to expect that significance levels 
will become increasingly better if in future years we can include more 
and more data from the 1980s. 
14) Other authors might have plausible reasons for taking earlier years such 
as 1973, the year of the oil crisis. We nonetheless took 1974, since 
this choice is consistent with Mandei's criterion of taking as an end 
point of a Kondratieff period the trough year of the last short-term 
business cycle belonging to the A or B period considered. The first 
year after that trough year is taken as a starting year of a new A or 
B period. According to the formal requirements of our test, we only took 
the trough year as a demarcation point between two periods. 
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Secondly: A similar problem applies to the beginning periods of the 
Italian and the Swedish series which start only in 1861 (instead of 1847) 
or for the NDP series of France, starting in 1900 (instead of 1893). 
The first estimate for the USA, covers only 4 years (1889-93) and should 
better not be interpreted. 
Thirdly: All the test results documented in this paper are based 
on the assumption that a second degree of autocorrelation exists in the 
residues of the series. Given the relatively strong evidence of the 
'classical' short-term business cycle from the I820s-30s onwards, taking 
no account of autocorrelation is likely to bias our test seriously. 
In view of the allegedly sinus-shaped pattern of the short-term 
business cycle, the assumption of a second degree of autocorrelation 
seems to be most appropriate. To be quite safe, we repeated all the tests, 
assuming also a first, a third, anda fourth degree of autocorrelation. 
The results did not substantially differ from those obtained with a 
second degree of autocorrelation, i.e. the significance levels changed 
only slightly so that our conclusions would have been the same using a 
different degree of autocorrelation. 
Fourth: There is one point in Mandei's chronology which is not clearly 
determined: he gives 1939 as well as 1948 as possible transition years 
to the A period of the fourth Kondratieff. Therefore, we tested all our 
series with Mandel's chronology, taking both 1939 and 1948. In inter-
preting the results, one property of our estimates of growth rates has 
to be kept in mind: We imposed a restriction on the estimation of 
trends such that the trend values of two subsequent periods are equal 
in the transition year, i.e. two subsequent trend periods intercept in 
their common transition year. This creates a kind of 'harmonica' effect: 
if one transition year is changed, this will influence the trend esti-
mates for all the other A and B periods in the series, with the harmo-
nica effect fading the further we move away from the altered transitionyear 
Therefore, taking 1948 instead of 1939 may bring about some change in 
the outcomes for the entire series. Tentative testing with slightly 
changed demarcation years showed, however, that, in general, the 
changes due to the 'harmonica' effect are not dramatic. Only in three 
out of our eleven series did the substitution of 1948 for 1939 bring 
notable changes in the significance levelLs: 
f 
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in the series for France, we got contradictory results: depending 
on whether we look at the GNP or at the industrial output series, or ) 
whether we take 1939 or 1948, we get significance levels respectively 
below and above the 95% level, and vice versa. Due to the unknown 
influence of World War II, it is hard to say which of the two 
transition years is more adequate. 
in the USA, World War II brought a strong boom; taking 1948 instead 
of 1939 would imply that we group this war-boom in the B period. 
This would obviously be a problematic decision that would bring 
down one significance level from 99% to 90%, and another from 99.8% 
to 95.8%. 
- in the Swedish series, substituting 1948 for 1939 would have an 
enormously negative impact for several significance levels. However, 
from looking at graph A7 we can be safe in saying that 1948 would 
" be much too late as a demarcation year. 
Since, in general, 1939 appears to be the more realistic demarcation 
point, the test results baëed on Mandei's chronology with 1939 are 
documented in table 3. A comparable table based on the Mandelian 
scheme taking the year 1948 can be found in the Appendix. To allow for 
an illustrative check of the Mandelian periodization, we included in 
graphs Al-Al1 of the Appendix, the trend lines estimated with nis time 
scheme (i.e. the trend estimates underlying table 3). It can be seen 
from these graphs, that in some cases the trend lines could be fitted 
a bit more perfectly, if we modified the Mandelian chronology so as 
to move either transition year a bit forward or backward in the series. 
As mentioned above, we have tried out some dating alternatives using 
the optical impression from the nine-year moving averages in the graphs 
of the Appendix. The outcomes from testing this 'softer' scheme are 
documented in table A2 of the Appendix. It becomes obvious from table 
A2 that our testing method is relatively robust against deviations 
from the 'hard' scheme. 
Only in the case of Sweden do these changes lead to a remarkable in-
crease in one significance level (from 85.5% to 96.1%). In all other 
cases, significance levels are only slightly changed; in most cases this 
change is in the positive direction. In the following, we will therefore 
concentrate our interpretation on the results obtained from testing the 
'rigid' Kondratieff chronology of Mandel. These results are given in 
table 3. 
Table 3: Average Growth Rates for A and B Periods of the Long Waves, their Approximate 
Significance of Differences in Average Growth Rates, According to Mandei's Lo 
Country arid Variable; 
A and B 
Periods: 
World 
Ind. 
Prod. 
(0 
World 
Ind. 
Prod. 
(2) 
Belgium 
Ind. 
Prod. 
Germany 
NNP 
France 
Ind. 
Prod. 
France 
NDP 
Sweden 
GDP 
Ital 
GDP 
A: 1792-1825 g : 
SE : 
2.63% 
(0.25) 
- - - 0.13% 
(1.32) 
- - -
sign. of diff.: 1.1% - - - 15.4% - - -
B: 1825-1847 g : 
SE ; 
3.89% 
(0.35) 
— 1.99% 
(0.62) -
1.88% 
(0.59) 
-
_ 
-
sign. of diff.: 34.9% - 98.4% - 38.8% - - -
A: 1847-1873 g : 
SE : 
3.66% 
(0.32) 
2.32% 
(0.36) 
3.85% 
(0.33) 
2.52% 
(0.57) 
1.61% 
(0.48) 
- 3.02% 
(0.57) 
0.92% 
(1.2 
sign. of diff.: 66.2% 23.3% 99.9% 34.0% 56.9% - 85.5% 61.1% 
B: 1873-1893 g : 
SE : 
3.38% 
(0.42) 
2.80% 
(0.37) 
1.46% 
(0.41) 
2.95% 
(0.61) 
1.44% 
(0.62) — 
2.20% 
(0.29) 
0.45% 
(0.66 
sign. of diff.: 75.4% 45.8% 99.5% 43.6% 60.3% - 98.6% 97.0% 
A: 1893-1913 g : 
SE : 
3.90% 
(0.42) 
2.73% 
(0.36) 
3.48% 
(0.44) 
2.77% 
(0.63) 
1.73% 
(0.60) 
2.81% 
(1.87) 
3.31% 
(0.26) 
2.65% 
(0.62 
sign. of diff.: 99,9% 97.5% 99.9% 97.7% 96.9% 91.0% 96.8% 98.0% 
B: 1913-1939
 g : 
SE : 
1.95% 
(0.29) 
1.63% 
(0.26) 
-0.19% 
(0.31) 
0.83% 
(0.44) 
-0.01% 
(0.44) 
-0.42% 
(0.81) 
2.55% 
(0.19) 
0.66% 
(0.44 
sign. of diff.: 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
A: 1939-1974 g : 
SE : 
4.68% 
(0.24) 
3.53% 
(0.21) 
3.30% 
(0.24) 
4.50% 
(0.34) 
4.83% 
(0.37) 
4.32% 
(0.64) 
4.46% 
(0.15) 
4.29% 
(0.36 
sign. of diff.: 61.9% 50.8% 79.8% 77.4% 92.5% 52.4% 99.9% 64.3% 
&: 1974- ... g : 
SE : 
3.94% 
(2.31) 
3.46% 
(3.55) 
1.95% 
(1.48) 
2.65% 
(2.27) 
1.95% 
(1.78) 
4.04% 
(4.18) 
-0.14% 
(1.28) 
3.26% 
(2.61 
g = estimated growth rate 
SE = Standard error of growth rate (calculated by a first-crder Taylor approximati 
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SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF TABLE 3 
The results from testing Mandei's 'rigid' chronology can be summarized 
as follows: 
in Kuczynski's two series on world industrial production, as well as 
in the series for France, Germany and the USA, significance levels 
vary between fairly good and excellent from the l890s up to the 
the present (with the exception of the most recent period for which 
we lack sufficiënt data for reliable testing). 
During the pre-1893 periods, there are no significant differences 
in average growth rates for the alleged A and B periods, and in 
several cases the variation of growth rates is even inverse to the 
one we would expect from a long wave view. 
- as opposed to the dichotomy between the pre-1890s and post- 1890s 
pattern in the above-mentioned series, the Belgian industrial 
production series of Gadisseur reveals a highly significant long 
wave pattern from the 1830s up to the present. 
- the outcomes of the GDp series for Italy and Sweden show a result 
similar to that of the Belgian data; i.e. from 1861 onwards growth 
rates vary in a way consistent with the long wave hypothesis. Only 
for the 1861 to 1873 period are significance levels below 95%, due 
to the high Standard error of the estimate (incomplete coverage of 
the 1848 to 1873 period). 
- very weak evidence for the existence of long waves comes from the 
two British series. As can be seen from a look at graphs AIO and All 
of the Appendix, the British series are dominated by a kind of very 
long-term life cycle of rising (1820s-1870s) and declining (from the 
1870s onwards) world market hegemony of British industry. This 
pattern can also be discerned from the growth rates in the above 
table. The 'hegemonial' life cy.de may have obliterated the Kondra-
tieff long wave. Only from the inter-war period onwards is the 
British growth pattern consistent with the Kondratieff long wave 
hypothesis. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A comparison of the above results with those from previous studies 
clearly indicates the importance of testing the long wave hypothesis 
with time series from a larger range of countries. Kuczynski (1978, 
1980) tested the hypothesis exclusively with his world series. Van 
Ewijk (1981, 1981a) and Van der Zwan (1980) concentrated heavily on 
British, U.S., French and German data (with Van der Zwan not even covering 
the post-World War II period). In our test, all these series proved 
indeed to have no long wave pattern in the pre-1890 period, and, in the 
British case, this holds even for the entire pre-World War I period. 
Consequently, the negative conclusions in the above-cited studies are 
not surprising. 
On the other hand, although our outcomes are much more in favour of 
the long wave hypothesis, they do not allow us to share the full 
optimism of the study by Glisman et al. (1978). One of us has previously 
expressed some scepticism about the method of discerning long waves by 
Glisman et al. (1978) (see Kleinknecht, 1981; for a reply see Glisman 
et al., 1981). From the viewpoint of our above results, this scepticism 
is only partially confirmed. With the exception of the British series, 
we can say that, according to our test, and for roughly the last hundred 
years, all the series tested show a fairly significant long wave pattern. 
However, as opposed to the study of Glisman et al., our results remain 
ambiguous for the pre-1890 period. On the one hand, important series 
such as those on world production, or the data for Great Britain and 
France, give no support for long-term fluctuations of the Kondratieff 
type during the pre-1890 period; on the other hand, the Belgian data 
show a highly significant long wave pattern from the l830s onwards; 
furthermore, evidence for long waves during the pre-1890 period comes 
from the Italian and Swedish data, although for shorter periods (from 
1861 onwards). 
There are several possibilities of dealing with the above ambiguity. 
Adherents of the long wave might argue that, in general, the further 
we go back in history, the less reliable our data will become. Here, 
an important argument could be derived from the Schumpeterian tradition, 
arguing with the role of young, innovative growth industries as a driving 
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force behind the A periods. This Schumpeterian element of growth may be 
somewhat underestimated insofar as young industries often only draw 
the attention of statisticians once they have reached a certain mini-
mum size. Naturally, if such as 'anti-Schumpeterian' bias should exist, 
it would be relevant rather for the 19th than for the 20th century. 
Still another argument could refer to the fact that only highly aggre-
gated data haven been used for the above tests. A rather smooth pattern 
in aggregate data could still be consistent with the Kondratieff long 
wave having a 'primary impact on price, wage, and interest rate trends, 
on the sectoral composition (rather than volume) of investment, and 
on regional and international income distribution', as has been em-
phasized most recently by Rostow (1982, p. 82). However, this possibi-
lity, too, can only be mentioned without being investigated in this 
paper. 
Summarizing the above points,- three positions appear to be reasonable. 
One of them could be that the Kondratieff cycle is indeed relevant even 
before the 1890s, but it does not show up due to biased data, or due 
to high levels of aggregation, and so on. 
A different position could be that it is not only bad data, but also 
the existence of movements temporarily stronger than the Kondratieff 
wave, that makes evidence in favour of the latter rather weak. Such 
an argument could refer to the already mentioned 'hegemonial' life 
cycle of Great Britain, the shorter-term Kuznets cycle, or the fact 
that countries entered their rapid growth 'take-off' phase at different 
times, some of them during the Kondratieff B periods. 
Still a different possibility could be that the mechanism bringing 
about Kondratieff long waves is indeed not relevant for the infant 
phase of capitalism, and that the system had to reach a certain level 
of consolidation before it could produce such waves; i.e. the Kondra-
tieff long wave would be primarily important for the era of 'Hochka-
pitalismus' and 'Spatkapitalismus'. The Kondratieff pattern from the 
1830s onwards in the Belgian series does not strongly contradict this 
argument, since Belgium has been one of the forerunners in the industria-
lization process of Continental Europe. 
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Principally, the outcomes of this paper are consistent with each of the 
three above propositions, and it is up to more detailed historical 
research to decide which is more realistic. 
Finally, an important limitation of this paper has to be kept in mind: 
no evidence has been given for the existence of Kondratieff long waves 
as true cycles. The above test does give evidence that in several 
major industrial countries there are - at least since the I890s -
differences in average gro* -.h rates for A and B periods which excellently 
fit into the time Schedule of Kondratieff long waves; and these differences 
are statistically significant. However, as already mentioned in the 
introduction of this paper, it can still be argued that these fluc-
tuations are due to historically unique causes, and need not necessarily 
be repeated in the future. This argument is supported by the fact that, 
up to now, such a low number of A and B periods can be observed that 
mtJely quantitative proof of long cycles is just not possible for the 
time being. Therefore, we fully agree with the point made by Spree 
(1978) or Rosenberg (1983), that a concept of long cycles can only 
attain credibility if long cycle theorists develop theoretically 
convincing endogènous models of the long cycle; i.e. it has to be 
demonstrated that A periods necessarily develop into B periods, and 
vice versa. 
As can be seenfrom the references in the above introduction, discussion 
around this topic has been quite vivid recently. The above results 
are sufficiently encouraging to continue that type of research work. 
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A P P E N D I X 
of t h e p a p e r : 
Long Waves in Aggregate Output? 
An Econometrie Test 
Contents: 
- Table Al Average Growth Rates for A and B periods of the 
Long Waves, Their Standard Errors, and the Signi-
ficance of Differences in Average Growth Rates, 
According to the Long Wave Chronology of Mandel 
(taking alternatively the year 1948 instead of 1939) 
Table A2 Average Growth Rates for A and B periods of the 
Long Waves, Their Standard Errors, and the Signi-
ficance of Differences in Average Growth Rates, 
According to Our 'Soft' Chronology. 
Graphs 
Al to All Aggregate Output Series (for sources and further 
details see table 1 in the text): Detrended with 
log-linear trend; the trend estimates which are 
underlying table 1 (in the text) as well as a 
9-year moving average are added. 
All aggregate output series are at constant prices. 
- Additional comment: Implementing the GLS estimate. 
Appendix, 
Table Al: Average Growth Rates for A and B Periods of the Long Waves, Thexr Standard E 
of Differences in Average Growth Rates, According to the Long Wave Chronology 
Countr> r and Variable: 
World World Belgium Germany France France Sweden Italy 
A and B Ind. Ind. Ind. NNP Ind. NDP GDP GDP 
Periods: Prod. (1) 
Prod. 
(2) 
Prod. Prod. 
A: 1792-1825 g : 2.63% — .^ _^ _ -0.001% _ _ 
SE : (0.25) - - - - (1.10) - -
sign. of diff.: 1.1% - - - - 8.7% - -
B: 1825-1847 g : 3.89% - 1.86% - - 1.90% - -
SE : (0.35) - (0.46) - - (0.44) - -
sign. of diff.: 34.2% - 99.9% - - 33.8% - -
A: 1847-1873 g : 3.65% 2.30% 3.86% 2.51% - 1.61% 3.02% 0.89% 
SE : (0.32) (0.27) (0.23) -,(0.56) - (0.35) (0.78) (0.73 
sign. of diff.: 62.5% 13.4% 99.9% 33.1% - 56.9% 78.7% 67.4% 
B: 1873-1893 g : 3.43% 2.85% 1.48% 2.96% - 1.48% 2.16% 0.45% 
SE : (0.42) (0.28) (0.29) (0.61) - (0.46) (0.44) (0.35 
sign. of diff.: 62.5% 33.1% 99.9% 40.4% - 54.5% 89.8% 99.9% 
A: 1893-1913 g : 3.67% 2.64% 3.34% 2.70% 2.91% 1.57% 3.12% 2.61% 
SE : (0.40) (0.26) (0.30) (0.60) (1.35) (0.44) (0.40) (0.31 
sign. of diff.: 98.4% 98.1% 99.9% 95.5% 96.4% 91.5% 53.9% 99.9% 
B: 1913-1948 g : 2.46% 1.89% 0.35% 1.28% -0.01% 0.72% 3.06% 1.05% 
SE : (0.22) (0.14) (0.17) (0.32) (0.40) (0.25) (0.22) (0.16 
sign. of diff.: 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 99.9% 
A: 1948-1974 g : 5.29% 4.12% 4.20% 5.62% 6.02% 6.00% 4.53% 5.55% 
SE : (0.34) (0.22) (0.25) (0.47) (0.59) (0.38) (0.33) (0.26 
sign. of diff.: 83.6% 72.3% 99.3% 95.9% 87.2% 99.8% 98.7% 98.8% 
B: 1974- ... g : 2.78% 2.07% 0.75% 1.28% 1.58% 0.74% 0.45% 0.83% 
SE : (2.36) (3.33) (1.21) (2.20) (3.48) (1.54) (1.61) (1.88 
g = estimated growth rate 
SE = Standard error of growth rate 
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Appendix, Table A2: Average Growth Rates for A and B Periods of the Long Waves, 
Their Standard Errors, and the Significance of Differences 
in Average Growth Rates, According to Our 'Soft' Chronology 
^*v^^ Country and 
^ \ . Var i ab1e: 
A and B ^ \ ^ 
periods "^""-v. 
Belgium 
(Ind. Pro-
duction 
World Ind. 
Production 
(excl. 
mining) 
Germany 
NNP 
Sweden 
(GDP) 
Italy 
(GDP) 
U.S.A. 
(GNP) 
A: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
-
1792-18251' 
2.63% 
(0.24) 
- - - -
sign. of diff. : - 1.0% - - - -
B: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1831-1847 
1.84% 
(0.46) 
1825-1847 
3.87% 
(0.34) _ _ _ 
-
sign. of diff. : 9.9% 43.0% - - - -
A: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1847-1873 
3.92% 
(0.24) 
1847-1871 
3.76% 
(0.35) 
1850-1874 
2.95% 
(0.57) 
1861-1874 
3.11% 
(0.42) 
1861-1873 
0.74% 
(0.71) _ 
sign. of diff. : 99.9% 79.5% 83.0% 96.0% 51.97, -
B: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1873-1889 
1.15% 
(0.36) 
1871-1883 
2.98% 
(0.68) 
1874-1882 
1.24% 
(1.39) 
1874-1891 
2.02% 
(0.26) 
1873-1898 
0.70% 
(0.28) 
1889-1893 
3.43% 
(2.85) 
sign. of diff. : 99.9% 82.8% 86.9% 99.9% 99.9% 64.9% 
A: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1889-1913 
3.22% 
(0.25) 
1883-1910 
3.82% 
(0.28) 
1882-1913 
3.09% 
(0.39) 
1891-1912 
3.41% 
(0.20) 
1898-1913 
3.16% 
(0.43) 
1893-1909 
4.67% 
(0.61) 
sign. of diff. : 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
B: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1913-1946 
0.23% 
(0.17) 
1910-1950 
2.54% 
(0.17) 
1913-1948 
1.18% 
(0.31) 
1912-1935 
2.24% 
(0.16) 
1913-1946 
0.89% 
(0.18) 
1909-1936 
2.03% 
(0.28) 
sign. of diff. : 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
A: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1946-1975 
3.93% 
(0.22) 
1950-1974 
5.51% 
(0.35) 
1948-1974 
5.65% 
(0.47) 
1935-1971 
4.46% 
(0.11) 
1946-1977 
5.13% 
(0.22) 
1936-1969 
3.85% 
(0.24) 
sign. of diff, : 96.5% 88.7% 95.9% 99.9% 89.7% 85.1% 
B: growth rate : 
stand, error : 
1975-1982 
1.07% 
(1.42) 
1974-1980 
2.44% 
(2.30) 
1974-1980 
1.33% 
(2.18) 
1971-1980 
1.38% 
(0.66) 
1977-1980 
-0.33% 
(4.10)' 
1969-1980 
2.62% 
(1.02) 
1) the growth rate for the 1740-1792 period is: 5.26 (0.86). 
26 
VALUE 
o 
o 
O 
* - • 
o. 
c 
w 
r+ 
H-
01 
>ï 
O 
O. 
C 
O 
r+ 
H-
O 
3 
fl> 
O 
3 
H' 3 
3 
tra 
GRAPH A2 : WORLD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (2) (incl. Mining) 
DETRENDED WITH -41.62127 + 0.02519 * YEAR 
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o 
CO 
-0.7-J 
1810 18:30 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1 
YEAR 
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GRAPH A7 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF SWEDEN 
DEÏRENDED WITH -56.54430 + 0.03121 * YEAR 
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GRAPH A8 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF ITALY 
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GRAPH A9 : GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE U.S.A. 
DETRENDED WITH -54.24515 -f 0.03106 * YËAR 
0.25 -i 
ra 
1880 1900 1920 1940 
YEAR 
GRAPH AIO : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
DETRENDED WITH -31.309:35 + 0.01785 * YEAR 
0 -;0 -i 
c> 
1850 1870 1890 1910 
YEAR 
19:30 
GRAEH A l l : MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION OF THE UNITED KING 
iPEffRENBED mm -41-11318 0.0239.7 * YEAR 
0.30 - i 
< 
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 
YEAR 
1920 1940 
37 
Apgendix 
Implementing the GLS estimate. 
Knowing the autocorrelation pattern: 
n
 2 
£ t = Z Piet-1 + Ut ( u t ~ I N ( ° ' ° } ) 
i=l 
it is possible to calculate the covariance matrix E and subsequently apply 
GLS. This is, however a time-consuming and computationally ineffecient 
method. It is known that there exists a triangular matrix V such that 
V'V = I - 1 
Therefore, V discribes a transformation, which, if applied to the 
residuals, gives us identical normally distributed non-correlated 
variables. We have now, in fact, shifted the problem of generating E to 
that of generating the triangular matrix V, describing the necessary 
transformation. The larger part of this transformation, however, follows 
directly from the rewritten autocorrelation pattern: 
n 
t . , M 1 t-i t i=l 
the right side of which consists of non-correlated disturbances, while 
the left side describes a row of the needed matrix V 
[0 ,.. .0 ,-p ,-p ,.. . ,- p-»- p , s 1 >0,.. ».0J 
It can easily be seen that we always need the n values preceding the 
values to be transformed; this implies a loss of observations at the 
beginning of the time series and after possible interruptions (World Wars). 
It is certainly possible to avoid the loss of observations caused by the 
interruptions, but this requires a substitution process based on the 
assumption that the autocorrelation pattern remains unchanged during the 
interrupted periods. Given the disturbances of the economies by World 
Wars, this does not appear to be a very realistic assumption. Therefore, 
we preferred to describe the disturbances before and after the interruptions 
separately; this implies that we treat the time series as if, after the 
interruptions, the stochastic process had started anew. Therefore, in 
some cases, we would lose three times the n starting observations. 
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To avoid this loss we also need to find the n rows describing the 
transformation for the first n observations. 
Clearly, this has to be done in a different manner. From the knowledge 
of the autocorrelation pattern we can conclude that the autocorrelation 
matrix Z is symmetrical inboth its diagonals. Therefore, its inverse 
I must be symmetrical inboth its diagonals as well. From the part of 
V we already know, and the fact that V is triangular we conclude that 
V is a band matrix. But if V is a band matrix so is Z . With the 
part of V we already know we can calculate a part of Z . The other 
parts of Z are easily constructed using the symmetry and its band 
form. Once we have found Z we can easily complete V using the 
method of Choleski. After using V to transform the observations we can 
apply OLS on the transformed variables. 
